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1.    INTRODUCTION 
 
Around the world, the number of people affected by disasters has increased. Since 2000, nearly 81.7 million people have 
been affected by disasters globally, with over 1.3 million of reported casualties (CRED 2018). These numbers highlight 
the need to design and implement efficient and effective disaster management systems, especially considering the limited 
resources available to deal with them (e.g. Sienou and Karduck 2012; Nathan et al. 2017). Recent disasters, however, have 
shown several shortcomings in these systems’ performance (Santos-Reyes et al. 2010). Among these are the deficient 
knowledge in emergency response, poor operational management, absence of leadership, lack of strategies, difficulties 
to allocate tasks, limited intergovernmental planning, and insufficient coordination  (Grünewald et al. 2010; Nigg 
et al. 2006). To overcome these challenges, there are calls for empirical work to analyse the decision-making structures 
and public policy in disasters (Holguin-Veras et al. 2012; Hart et al. 1993). 
 
Even after different articles have explored the implications of decision-making structures in disasters (e.g. Takeda 
and Helms 2006; Dhouha and Gonzalo 2013; Manyena 2006; Scolobig et al. 2015; Drabek 1985), command and 
control problems have been identified in several situations (Sienou and Karduck 2012; Van Wassenhove 2006; 
Whybark et al. 2010). These problems lead to the emergence of ad-hoc norms during disasters (Drabek and McEntire 
2003), which affect and are affected by operational activities on the ground. Currently, the link and the discrepancies 
between the decision-making structure and the operational activities on the ground have not been sufficiently researched 
(Hart et al. 1993).This situation creates the need to look closer to the link between both levels. The purpose is to 
enhance the performance (i.e. the support provided to disaster victims) achieved by disaster management activities. 
 
This article contributes to the understanding of the interaction of the components of disaster management response systems 
and their effect on logistics performance. It has been long thought that the decision-making structure used in a disaster 
management system has automatic implications on logistics performance (Brouillette and Quarantelli 1971). It has been 
seen during disaster operations instead that performance is commonly affected by the operational decisions made on the 
ground (Holguín-Veras et al. 2012). Further investigations are necessary to analyse the relationship between the decision-
making structure and operational activities on the ground to provide insights about their impact on logistics performance. This 
article is contending that it is the alignment of both components what has an effect on performance. 
 
Disaster management at the organisational level has been studied from the perspective of Organisational Studies (OS) (Mileti 
and Sorensen 1987), whereas operational activities on the ground have been explored in the field of humanitarian logistics 
with the support of Operations Management (OM) (Gupta 1995; Taylor and Taylor 
2009). Even though the link between OM and the organisational structure has been stated in the literature recently 
(MacCarthy et al. 2016), there is a disconnection between both literatures. As part of OS, problems with centralised and 
decentralised systems have been identified by focusing on the impact of the decision-making structures. Among these 
articles, however, there is little discussion about the importance of activities on the ground. On the other hand, different 
models and frameworks have been developed in OM with the aim to improve logistics performance (e.g. Chang et al. 2007; 
Tofighi et al. 2016; Ransikarbum and Mason 2016). Unfortunately, these articles neglect the value of the decision-making 
structure and how it affects the models developed. Both perspectives have valuable insights to support disaster operations and 
maximise logistics performance. Thus, a greater understanding of the elements hindering logistics performance may be 
gained by blending the perspective of OS and OM. This article represents a step toward such integration. 
 
The central difficulty presented by the perspectives undertaken in the fields of OS and OM is the assumption of a precedence 
because of hierarchy (Mileti and Sorensen 1987) and urgency (Wijngaard et al. 2006), respectively. This article argues that 
looking at the decision-making structure or at the operational activities on the ground independently can create a disjointed 
disaster management system with a negative impact on performance. Instead, Ford and Schellenberg (1982) stated that an 
organisation can be assessed based on the extent in which the decision-making structure and the operational activities on the 
ground converge. Taking up this perspective, this article considers the manner in which the alignment between both levels can 
be used to reduce the shortcomings of each one of them. Hence, the purpose of this article is not to determine which perspective 
should take precedence, but to consider both perspectives and their relation to understand the conditions 
hindering logistics performance. 
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structure, the operational activities on the ground, and their link, are analysed to provide insights to improve disaster 
management systems. The purpose is to tackle the following research question: What is the effect on logistics performance of 
the alignment between the  operational activities on the ground and the decision-making  structure adopted in 
disaster management? From the practical perspective, this research analyses both levels and the fit between them based on 
empirical data to provide insights about the Mexican disaster management system. Real data was gathered to develop an 
analysis that could also provide valuable results for practitioners (Charles et al. 2016). 
 
This article contributes to practice and research in a variety of ways. First, it increases understanding of the interaction  
of the components of disaster management response systems and their relationships (i.e. the decision-making 
structure and the operational activities on the ground). Second, the paper integrates the perspectives of OS and OM 
into a holistic approach to improve disaster management systems. Third, this article proposes a novel perspective to enhance 
the performance of disaster management systems considering the alignment between the hierarchical decision-making 
structure and the operational activities on the ground. Finally, this paper provides recommendations for best practices in 
humanitarian logistics which are applicable to Mexico and other countries using centralised decision-making. This has the 
potential to support researchers on OS and OM to develop more comprehensive solutions for disaster management. 
 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces relevant articles from the perspective  of this research 
and the methodology used is presented in Section 3. Section 4 describes the Mexican framework for disaster 
management,  whereas  Section  5 introduces  the analysis  of the case.  Section  6 provides  a discussion  of the 
results  obtained  while  Section  7 enumerates  some  policy implications.  Concluding  remarks  are presented  in 
Section 8. 
 
2.    LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This paper is focused on the link between the decision-making structure and the operational activities on the ground, and 
its impact on performance of the alignment between them. To place the article in the literature, initially this section 
introduces the perspective of operational activities on the ground to describe the focus of articles in the area and the 
importance of logistics performance. Then, the literature on decision-making in disaster management organisations is 
presented to define the most common perspectives used before in the area (i.e. centralisation and decentralisation). Next, 
articles related to performance in disaster management are discussed. These section serve as context to frame the final 
section linking the three dimensions. 
 
2.1. Operational activities on the ground 
 
Humanitarian logistics are essential during disaster management to support affected communities promptly (Nathan 
et al. 2017). This area is closely related to disaster preparedness  and response. Caunhye et al. (2012) identified 
evacuation, facility location, stock pre-positioning, relief distribution, capacity planning, inventory management, and 
casualty transportation as closely connected activities which have been commonly studied in literature of 
humanitarian logistics. 
 
There are several articles developing models and frameworks to achieve successful operations on the field (See 
Caunhye et al. 2012), even incorporating “social cost” in the performance measures (See Holguín-Veras et al. 
2013). Usually, operational activities on the ground are performed in line with policy and procedures (Hart et al. 
1993), although many times urgency becomes a factor causing inconsistency (Wijngaard et al. 2006). The reason is 
because of the inconsistencies between plans and the operational environment (Nathan et al. 2017). Despite the 
importance of decision-making structures and hierarchy between units (Wijngaard et al. 2006), however, most of  the 
articles in the field of humanitarian logistics are neglecting to incorporate these dimensions. 
 
2.2.  Decision-making in disaster management organisations 
 
The organisational design is relevant because the fit within the internal components of the system, as well as the 
fit between the system and the environment have a significant effect on performance (Ruffini et al. 2000; Dalton 
et al. 1980;  Ford  and  Schellenberg  1982).  The  process  and  structures  involved  in decision-making  are  key 
dimensions in the organisational  structure (Al-Abbadi 2015). These play an important role in the efficiency of 
organisations  because  they affect  the kind of problems  faced in operations.  For instance,  in a decentralised 
system,  resource  constraints  can  create  divisiveness  among  groups,  something  less  likely  to  happen  on 
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centralised  systems.  On the other  hand,  in decentralized  systems,  decision-making  has  to go through  fewer 
layers of authority allowing more responsiveness, unlike centralised systems (Takeda and Helms 2006). 
 
There has been a considerable discussion about the appropriateness  of centralisation and decentralization in the 
business sector (Dalton et al. 1980). Encouraging  the rationalisation  of decision-making  with inclusion of few 
individuals leads to centralisation, whereas promoting wider participation in decision-making leads to 
decentralisation  (Marks 1978). The former has several layers of managers, whereas the latter has fewer layers 
and several decisions are made in parallel. Marks (1978) and Dalton et al. (1980) provided evidence that 
decentralization can be highly efficient and effective in the business environment, although Dalton et al. (1980) 
also  argued  that  a  decentralised  system  needs  more  time  for  coordination  and  the  resolution  of  conflicts. 
Furthermore,  they  stated  that  many  studies  supporting  decentralization  were  not  using  “hard”  performance 
measures, constraining the value of the results. 
 
During disaster management, the overarching goal of survival often leads governments to implement centralised decision-
making to attempt to control and find optimal solutions (Child 1972; Quarantelli 1988). That is the reason most 
emergency management systems are modelled using this approach (Takeda and Helms 2006). In the literature, Takeda 
and Helms (2006) discuss the use of bureaucratic models for emergency response and identify centralised decision-
making, external knowledge, complex conditions of the disaster and lack of flexibility as major issues for the 
bureaucratic model. Dhouha and Gonzalo (2013) study the impact of centralisation of decision-making during the 
reconstruction stage using a case from the 2003 flood in Tunisia. Their results showed that the top-down approach 
achieved a poor level of satisfaction. 
 
Centralisation has been considered a bad model for disasters because of its inherent disadvantages (Quarantelli 
1988). The large number of organisations that require access to the disaster management system (Child 1972; Boin and 
Lagadec 2000; Holguin-Veras et al. 2012), the need for flexibility in the implementation of policy and regulation (Oloruntoba 
2005), and the need of non-programmable responses (Boin and Lagadec 2000) are reasons why humanitarian 
organisations are moving their supply chain towards decentralisation (Charles et al. 
2016). Manyena (2006) focused on local authorities to explore the link between disaster management and disaster 
resilience. The author emphasises autonomy for decision-making, fiscal and administrative issues, and an appropriate 
organisational structure as relevant elements to build resilience. Chang Seng (2013) describes the disaster preparedness of a 
decentralized system in an Early Warning System in Indonesia. They identified national security and social  conflict, 
challenges  of implementing  decentralization  policies, funding and resources as the main barriers for institutional 
advancement in disaster risk reduction. 
 
In view of the evidence against centralisation, Scolobig et al. (2015) argue that a people-centred approach could 
be more suitable for modern conditions given the limitations in capability of a single organisation,  such as the 
government.  Similarly,  Kovacs  and  Spens  (2011)  mentioned  the  value  of  community-based  approaches  to 
integrate beneficiaries in activities. Nevertheless, these approaches have been more commonly adopted under 
improvised  circumstances,  such as during  Hurricane  Sandy.  The reason  is that decentralized  models  can be 
complex  (Manyena  2006) and very challenging  to implement  in the context  of some countries  (Chang Seng 
2013).  Garschagen (2016) argue that decentralising disaster management in a centralised system, such as a 
government, faces several challenges for implementation because of the lack of investment in capacity building and 
procedural adjustment. Furthermore,  decentralization  may cause lack of standardization  and fragmentation if it is 
not properly prepared and managed (Thomas E. Drabek 1985), a major concern for disaster operations. 
 
Therefore, the major decision-making  structures in the literature (Garschagen 2016) have shown several 
shortcomings at the level of the operational activities on the ground. The current discussion in the field, however, is 
still not integrating this dimension. 
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There  are extensive  studies  measuring  performance  in the supply  chain  (Beamon  1999;  Helena  2007).  The 
purpose of the operational activities on the ground is to satisfy the requirements of the victims (Thomas and Mizushima 
2005). Considering the high stakes involved in disaster operations (Kovacs and Spens 2011), this paper defines logistics 
performance as the ability to successfully satisfy such needs. Beamon (1999) classified supply chain performance 
measures in three main types: resources, output and flexibility. Resources account for the input of a process, whereas output 
involves the organisation’s and customers’ goals, and flexibility refers to the capability to adapt to fluctuations (Beamon 
1999). The successful achievement of these three measures is linked to the satisfaction of the needs of disaster victims. 
The reason logistics performance is studied in this article is the focus on the support to disaster victims. Operational 
activities on the ground are performed by a large number of actors such as: host (governments with responsibility over the 
affected areas) and associated governments,  regional  authorities,  State  governments,  military  units,  NGOs,  private  
and  quasi-private organisations (Cozzolino 2012; Mileti and Sorensen 1987). Instead of looking to the performance of 
individual organisations (i.e. the supply side), this research is focused on the ability of the disaster management system to 
satisfy the requirements of the victims (i.e. the demand side). This support is linked to the three types of measures 
described by Beamon (1999). 
 
Focusing  on logistics  performance,  Thompson  (2015)  assessed  the  current  state  of  disaster  logistics  in the 
Caribbean  through  eight  in-depth  unstructured  interviews  with  logistics  managers  and  heads  of  disaster 
agencies. They identified a lack of a coherent and integrated logistics strategy as a common problem. Nigg et al. 
(2006) provided an assessment of governmental activities focused on evacuation and providing shelters and 
temporary housing after Katrina in the United States. The authors identified several issues in terms of shelter 
management, lack of policies for successful evacuation across states, poor standardisation and disjointed local 
political cultures. 
 
2.4.  The decision-making structure and logistics performance 
 
The research presented so far provides context about operational activities on the ground, decision-making structures 
and performance in disaster management. This section includes sources looking at the link between these dimensions. 
 
In view of the variety of organisations involved in disaster management, research has considered different types 
of organisations.  Some studies analyse Non-Governmental  Organisations  (NGOs) during disaster operations to 
improve   their   supply   chain   (Kumar   et  al.   2009),   propose   an   integrated   framework   for   post-disaster 
reconstruction  (Lu and Xu 2015), determine  the location  of facilities  and the amount to stock to preposition 
based  on  decentralisation   policies  from  Red  Cross  (Charles  et  al.  2016),  and  analyse  the  role  of  the 
organisational structure of NGOs in their influence on policy development (Marquez 2016). Additionally, other 
authors  have  looked  at  the  link  between  NGO’s  organisational  principles  and  performance  (Hilhorst  and 
Schmiemann 2002) and thus provided insights about the challenges for logistics in these organisations (Kovacs 
and Spens 2009). 
 
In many countries, the military provides primary assistance in cases of disaster because of its structure and the 
resources it has available (Cozzolino 2012; Heaslip and Barber 2014). Heaslip and Barber (2014) focus on the 
organisational  challenges of the military for disaster operations and how the interaction between coordination, 
logistics and human resources can improve performance in disaster operations. 
 
Despite the importance  of the NGOs and the military, the role of the host government  as initiators of disaster 
response is prominent. These governments have the jurisdiction and authority to allow operations to be carried 
out (Cozzolino 2012), and they become responsible for disaster operations abiding by a set of national and 
international  regulations  (Dube et al. 2016). Therefore,  the decision-making  structure  of the host government 
affects the overall performance of disaster operations (Brouillette and Quarantelli 1971) and its activities on the 
ground are the reference point for the disaster management system. From that perspective, Westley et al. (2008) 
performed  an analysis  of bureaucracy  based  on FEMA  following  Katrina  in the United  States.  The authors 
pointed out failures associated to the provision of relief and care to the people affected because of the highly 
centralised institutional system which hindered participation of more people in the decision process. 
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Chandes and Paché (2010) proposed the use of adaptive collective strategies to improve humanitarian logistics. They used a 
case in Peru to show the potential benefits of collective action. Using participant observation, they analysed the 
governmental response and found the importance of a central directive unit, with the purpose of coordinating the multiple 
civil defence committees. They suggested the inclusion of adapted performance indicators, mass customization, and 
collective action to improve humanitarian operations. Richter et al. (2013) proposed a decentralized evacuation 
application on mobile devices for situations in which a centralised systems has failed or is non-existent. Using 
agent-based simulation to test the peer-to-peer information communication, the authors showed how a decentralised 
approach can provide advantages to improve evacuation management. 
 
In the literature presented we find that there is evidence of the assessment of different systems based on an 
organisational  view or a logistics perspective, but the fit between them has been neglected before. The aim of 
this article is to fill that gap by taking a holistic approach to analyse the impact of misalignment between those 
levels on performance during emergencies. 
 
3.    METHODOLOGY 
3.1.  Overall design 
 
In order to analyse the impact of the alignment between the decision-making tructure and operational activities 
on the ground, this study includes a case based on the activities of the Mexican disaster management system during the 
worst disaster experienced in thirty years. Given the exploratory nature of the research question (What is the effect on 
logistics performance of the alignment between the operational activities on the ground and the decision-making structure 
adopted in disaster management?), a case study approach using empirical data was undertaken to analyse the situation in its 
natural context (Voss et al. 2002). 
 
Case studies can be used for theory generation, theory testing or theory elaboration (Ketokivi and Choi 2014) 
because it is a strategy that allows to understand the dynamics existent within a defined situation (Eisenhardt 
1989). This paper is defined as theory elaboration, which is placed in between theory testing and theory generation 
(Ketokivi and Choi 2014). Fisher and Aguinis (2017) defined theory elaboration as “…the process of conceptualizing and 
executing empirical research using pre-existing conceptual ideas or a preliminary model as a basis for developing new 
theoretical insights by contrasting, specifying, or structuring theoretical constructs and relations to account for and explain 
empirical observations” (Fisher and Aguinis 2017). 
 
A theory can be elaborated through the in-depth analysis of the relationships among different elements considering 
the general context and previous findings simultaneously  (Ketokivi and Choi 2014). Using constructs and 
relationships from OS and OM, this research empirically analyses the effect on logistics performance of the relation 
between the decision-making structure and the operational activities on the ground. The purpose is to elaborate on current 
knowledge and increase the understanding about the relationship between the decision-making structure and the operational 
activities on the ground using empirical data, which can lead to the development of more integrated solutions. 
 
3.2. Research planning 
 
For the development of this research the methodology outlined by Eisenhardt (1989) was followed. Initially, literature 
from different areas was analysed and used to define the research question. Next, the case was selected considering the 
vulnerability of developing countries (Davarzani et al. 2015) and the research question defined. Then, archival data and 
interview were selected as data collection methods and data collection was undertaken. After the information was 
collected, a within-a-case analysis was performed to investigate the relationships between components and their effect 
in logistics performance. Next, the results were compared and contrasted with the extant literature and closure was reached 
(Eisenhardt 1989). 
 
3.3.  Case selection 
 
The case study method is one of the most common approaches undertaken in Operations Management  studies 
(Taylor and Taylor 2009) because it can be used to explain complex real-world phenomena (Peter-Christian and 
Dmitrij  2015).  It has been used in this research  because  it can provide  relevant  insights  about  the situation 
(Helena 2007). Yin (1994) states that case studies should be used when “a why or how question is being asked 
about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no control”. Case studies can help to 
understand more deeply the processes and context, and to provide meaningful insights in an underexplored field. 
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ructures and public policy in disasters (Holguin-Veras  et al. 2012), a case study can be used to capture the 
conditions  generated by the disaster and evaluate the performance of the disaster management system. Davarzani 
et al. 2015 suggest that it is important to understand the impact and performance of the decision-making structure in 
settings with political and economic uncertainty, such as the conditions experienced in developing countries. 
Accordingly, a case study in Mexico was selected because it fulfils these characteristics.  The  case  was  based  on  the  
2007  flooding  in Villahermosa. 
 
Mexico is located in a very active seismic area and in the path of hurricanes and tropical storms coming from 
the Atlantic and the Pacific (Saldana-Zorrilla  2015). From 1950 to 2015, the country has been the most disaster 
prone nation in the Americas after the United States (CRED 2016). Mexico’s case is also interesting because it 
has the second largest economy in Latin America, while at the same time, nearly half the population  lives in 
poverty  conditions   (INEGI   2012).  Despite   having  a  disaster   policy  in  place,  recent  experiences   have 
demonstrated  that  the  support  provided  to  disaster  victims  using  a  top-down  centralised  decision-making 
structure is not achieving the expected results (Santos-Reyes et al. 2010). 
 
Developing  countries,  such as Mexico,  commonly  use a ‘military’  approach  for  decision-making  because  it 
provides  a known  and  manageable  structure.  Activities  can be delegated  depending  on technical  skills  and 
expertise  using a centralised  model of management  involving  a single ‘leading’  organisation  (Scolobig  et al. 
2015). However, it has been pointed out how this approach is focussed more on the process than in the outcome 
(Takeda and Helms 2006). 
 
The organisational  and decision-making  structure  of the Mexican  disaster  management  system  was acquired 
through  a  review  of  Mexican  regulations,  white  papers,  and  research  articles.  The  operational  procedures 
employed  by  the  Mexican  organisations  involved  in  humanitarian  logistics  in  the  field  included  rules  and 
regulations  from organisations  involved  in disaster  relief  operations,  as well as guidelines  provided  by Plan 
Marina  and Plan DN-III  (Disaster  management  plans for the most  serious  disasters)  from the navy and the 
military,  respectively.   Additionally,   the  emergency  relief  request  process  for  the  Natural  Disaster  Fund 
(FONDEN) was analysed along with the process to request medicines in case of emergency. 
 
3.4.  Data collection methods 
 
Data collection was performed through a combination of interviews and gathering of archival data. Information 
about medical services and procedures was obtained from an interview with CENAPRECE [National Centre of 
Preventive Plans and Disease Control (CENAPRECE),  personal communication,  September 2, 2014], whereas 
an interview with a representative from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) was carried out to understand the procedures undertaken by them and other organisations for disaster 
situations  in  Mexico  [Office  for  Coordination  of  Humanitarian  Affairs  (OCHA),  personal  communication, 
August  28,  2014].  Additionally,  an  exploratory  interview  was  undertaken  with  members  of  the  disaster 
management  unit  from  the  Mexican  National  Defence  Secretariat  (SEDENA)  [SEDENA,  personal 
communication,  March 11, 2010]. The interview involved a set of written questions answered by the officials 
prior to the interview, and open-ended questions about general procedures and practices. 
 
Secondary information about the circumstances of the disaster was obtained through a series of freedom of 
information  (FOI)  requests  directed  to relevant  Local,  State  and National  government  agencies.  Participants 
other than the government  were incorporated  using reports and press releases from these other organisations. 
This included the relief aid sent by other governments and international organisations. 
 
The data collected provides insights about the implications of the current system in performance. The database 
collected  included  the organisational  decision-making  structure  and the logistics  activities  performed  on the 
ground in the country. Having both sides is essential to explore the impact of the alignment between them on 
performance.  Therefore,  both sides can be analysed to draw conclusions  from a holistic perspective,  with the 
purpose of identifying the real challenges affecting performance beyond the common constructs associated with 
the operational or the organisational view. 
 
3.5. Data analysis 
 
Data analysis is the least standardised part of the application of the case study method (Eisenhardt 1989). The data from the 
interviews and FOI requests was initially used to draw a picture of the logistics activities performed by authorities 
during the disaster. Based on that, an analysis of supply and demand was carried out. 
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The information about the resources deployed by the organisations was contrasted to the demand of disaster victims 
based on the operational parameters (i.e. personnel required per activity, service capacity of the products, shelter 
requirements) provided by the organisations, policy and guidelines publicly available. This section of the analysis was 
clustered based on the logistics activity to identify patterns present in the case. 
 
Based on the performance of the logistics activities, the results were analysed from the lens of the decision- making 
structure used in Mexico using the three type of metrics described by Beamon (1999). From that point onwards, the analysis 
included the comparison and contrast of the results with extant literature (Eisenhardt 
1989) to evaluate the accuracy of considering an OS or OM perspective alone. Then, the alignment between the decision-
making structure and the operational activities on the ground is investigated, and its effect on logistics performance was 
analysed. 
 
4.    DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN MEXICO 
4.1.  National Civil Protection  System 
 
Decision-making  in disaster situations in Mexico uses a centralised, top-down structure to avoid uncertainty in 
the control and management of operations (Parnell 2015), with the National System for Civil Protection (SINAPROC)  
as the coordinating  body in charge of develop and oversee plans from different participants for disaster 
management. 
 
Humanitarian  logistics  in Mexico  basically  involves  three main activities:  the provision  of food, shelter  and 
medical attention  (Ordaz and Zeballos  2007). These activities  are carried out with support from SINAPROC 
based on the guidelines established as part of the policy. 
 
4.2.  Disaster management structure 
 
Disaster   management   in   the   country   includes   four   main   branches:   executive   coordination,   technical 
coordination,  technical  support  and co-responsibility.  SINAPROC  works  as the  coordinator  of the  different 
branches to manage emergency situations. Each branch has a different purpose; 
 
• Executive   coordination.   The   Ministry   of   Interior   is   the   entity   responsible   for   working   with 
organisations of the three government levels (viz. National, State and Municipal). 
• Technical coordination. Organisations with the capability and expertise to provide technical counsel for 
the planning, operation and assessment of activities related to disaster management in any emergency. 
• Technical support. Organisations with capabilities to provide aid and advice for a specific disaster. 
• Co-responsibility.  Organisations  charged  with the responsibilities  to provide  supplementary  support 
along with human and material resources to the emergency activities on top of their normal duties. 
 
4.3.  Guidelines for disaster response 
 
After a disaster strikes a community, the first agency on location should provide aid to the victims, and then municipal  
authorities  have to take over to continue the relief activities.  If local authorities  can cope with the disaster they 
oversee the whole operation, otherwise they have to notify state authorities to ask for support. That procedure  is 
repeated for the case of state and federal authorities,  until the full resources  of SINAPROC  are deployed (Ordaz 
and Zeballos 2007). This approach is consistent with other governmental systems, in which as the disaster develops 
response structures at local, regional and national level need to be requested to deal with the situation. (Roshan 
Bhakta et al. 2014). 
 
For initial  supplies  after  an event,  authorities  in Mexico  use  stock  prepositioning  because  this strategy  can 
prevent  response  delays.  Mexican  authorities  use  a  prepositioning   policy  for  food  pantries,  whereas  for 
medicines,  some kits are stocked  at local units, but most of the medicines  are available  on request  after the 
disaster strikes (SEGOB 2012). Information about the method to determine the level of stock, however, is not 
clearly defined. 
 
For the ongoing supply of relief, authorities can request relief items based on needs assessment.  The level of 
demand  is established  by regional  authorities  to request  support  and  supplies  from  FONDEN.  Consumable 
goods are arranged in kits to provide support for four people for four days. The rest of the items are provided 
based on the composition of the population. The products listed in the “Agreement for the operation of the fund 
for natural disasters” can be charged to FONDEN (SEGOB 2012), using them as standard units for distribution. 
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reventive  Planning  and  Disease Control, namely CENAPRECE  (SEGOB 2012). A council is in charge of 
evaluating the requests based on the information available about the emergency. In case the request is approved, 
the items are gathered/procured  and sent  to  the  area  [National   Centre   of  Preventive   Plans   and  Disease   
Control   (CENAPRECE),   personal communication, September 2, 2014]. 
 
The relief is sent to communities and facilities supported by authorities. Civil protection authorities must select 
places in which acceptable living conditions can be provided to disaster victims to serve as shelters prior to any 
emergency  [SEDENA,   personal  communication,   March  11,  2010].  Risk  atlases  should  be  developed  to 
graphically  show  the levels  of danger  in different  regions.  Using these  atlases,  a list of suitable  shelters  is 
provided to people before the disaster strikes to ease evacuation  procedures and allow them to move to these 
facilities in cases of emergency (Saldana-Zorrilla 2015). 
 
 
5.    DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN THE  FLOOD OF VILLAHERMOSA IN 2007 
5.1.  Villahermosa, Mexico 
 
Villahermosa  is  the  county  seat  of  the  Municipality  of  Centro  (CENTRO)  and  the  capital  of  the  State  of 
Tabasco.  The  links  of  Villahermosa   to  natural  gas  production  and  ports  for  oil  exports  make  the  area 
economically  important  for the country.  Nonetheless,  around  49.6%  of the population  are living  in poverty 
(INEGI 2012). 
 
Villahermosa is surrounded by the rivers Grijalva and Carrizales, it borders with the water body “Laguna de los 
Espejos” and it is close to the “Las Peñitas” dam system, which makes the city an area very prone to flooding. In 
the absence of a successful relocation policy for the community, disaster management in the area is a priority for 
the State government. 
 
5.2.  Conditions of the flood of 2007 in Villahermosa 
 
A severe  cold  front  caused  strong  rainfall  in several  parts  of the  country,  especially  in Villahermosa.  This 
situation, combined with the opening of the floodgates of the “Peñitas” dam, created a catastrophic event with 
nearly 80% of Tabasco covered by water (approximately  19,800 Km2), with water heights of four meters and 
more than one million people affected (Santos-Reyes et al. 2010). Around 90% of the area of Villahermosa was 
covered by water. 
 
5.3.  Data collected about the flood in Villahermosa 
 
Most of the data collection was done through FOI requests submitted to national and state authorities using the 
list of organisations  involved in logistics activities during disasters. The list was available from the guidelines 
for disaster management in the country. A total of 134 requests were directed to eight regional authorities and 
128  requests  were  filed  to  nine  National  authorities.  Among  the  seventeen  agencies  approached,  thirteen 
agencies declared to have participated and were included in the analysis. At regional level the municipality of 
Centro,  family  services  (DIF),  State  Health  Ministry  of Tabasco  (STABASCO),  Public  Security  Secretariat 
(SSP), Social Security Institute of the State of Tabasco (ISSET), Civil Protection (PC) and the Transport and 
Communications  Secretariat  (SCT).  At  National  level,  information  was  collected  from  DICONSA,  Social 
Security Mexican Institute (IMSS), Health Ministry (SMEXICO), SEDENA, Ministry of Interior (SEGOB) and 
the Navy (SEMAR). Given that large-scale situations require to support local capacity with other sources, relief 
aid sent by other governments recorded by Mexican authorities was also included. 
 
Concerning  operations  after  the disaster  occurred,  other  organisations  were  contacted  to enquire  for reports 
about their involvement in relief activities. Online reports and press releases were gathered as well. Information 
about  organisations  such  as  the  Presbyterian  Mission  Agency,  Action  by Churches  Together  International, 
Aktion  Deutschland  Hilft, Samaritan’s  purse,  Malteser,  World  Vision,  and Search and Rescue  Assistance  in 
Disasters was obtained, as well as information about the Mexican Red Cross. 
 
The overview  of the data collected can be seen in Table  1. The table includes  information  about the source 
institution  and  the  official  document  reference  (if  applicable).  Information  collected  included  emergency 
facilities used, demand served, relief items pre-positioned, personnel employed, vehicles involved, the variation 
of demand per period, international aid, and supply capacity from the organisations involved. 
 
Table 1. Data collected about the case of Villahermosa 
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1 
2 
3 Type of data Source FOI 
4 Shelters used PC, ISSET 700106513, 06401914 
5 Facility cleaning cost DIF 1236000003414 
6 Distribution centres used SEDENA, DICONSA  700003414, 2015000000714 
7 
Procurement per product DICONSA  R2015000008113 
Required personnel per 
8 
activity 
SEDENA, PC, IMSS, DICONSA  700003214, 00001514, 00430914, 00432114, 
64101320214, 700004914, 2015000010414 
9 
Number of personnel per 
10 activity per organisation 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 Total personnel per 
17 
agency
 
18 
19 
20 
21 
DICONSA, DIF, IMSS, ISSET, PC, 
SMEXICO, STABASCO, SCT, SEDENA, 
SEGOB, SEMAR, SSP 
 
 
 
 
DICONSA, DIF, IMSS, ISSET, PC, 
SMEXICO, STABASCO, SCT, SEDENA, 
SEGOB, SEMAR, SSP 
2015000001314, 2015000003814, 
2015000004014, 06399914, 0064100438914, 
06644914, 06402614, 06402714, 
0001200006714, 06400314, 06243714, 
0000700031014, 0000700144314, 
0000700106513, 0000400264914, Press release 
148/2007, 05924314 
2015000001314, 2015000003814, 
2015000004014, 06399914, 0064100438914, 
06644914, 06402614, 06402714, 
0001200006714, 06400314, 06243714, 
0000700031014, 0000700144314, 
0000700106513, 0000400264914, Press release 
148/2007, 05924314 
22 Vehicles used CENTRO, DICONSA, DIF, IMSS, PC, 
23 SMEXICO, STABASCO, SEDENA, 
24 SEGOB, SEMAR, SSP 
25 SEDENA 
26 
27 
28 
05923014, 05923214, 2015000001014, 
2015000003714, 2015000003914, 06400114, 
0064100439014, 0064100439414, 06402814, 
0001200006814, 05923814, 05924014, 
0000700002614, 0000700031114, 
0000700031314, 0000700106513, 
0000400264914, Press release 148/2007, 
05924414 
29 Medicines delivered  SEGOB  0000400160314 
30 Flood mask CENAPRED  0413000000214 
31 Technical reports of the 
32 situation 
SEMAR, CENAPRED  0064100439014, 0413000000514 
33 International aid SRE 0000500088214 
34 Elevation models of the 
35 region 
United States Geological Survey (www.usgs.gov) and the website of the National Institute of 
Geography and Statistics (INEGI) in Mexico (http://www.inegi.org.mx/) 
36 Road network  Software developed by INEGI, namely SCINCE 2010 (http://www.inegi.org.mx/) 
37 Neighbourhoods 
38 denominated Basic Geo- 
Statistical Area 
39 
(AGEBs) 
Software developed by INEGI, namely SCINCE 2010 (http://www.inegi.org.mx/) 
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World Vision, Search and Rescue Assistance in Disasters, Medical Teams International, 
Adventist Development and Relief Agency, Americares and the World Food Programme. 
 
 
5.4.  Logistics activities in Villahermosa 
 
Based on the activities considered by Caunhye et al. (2012), the information gathered was used to analyse the 
operations during the flood in Villahermosa. Unfortunately, there was no information available about casualty 
transportation,  capacity planning, or inventory management, thus the analysis is focused on evacuation, facility 
location, stock pre-positioning, and relief distribution. 
 
Evacuation and Facility location 
 
Information from Civil Protection, the Social Security Institute of the State of Tabasco and the Mexican National 
Defence Secretariat  showed  that  around  99,000  people  were  sheltered  during  the  emergency.  The number  of  
evacuees  was  even  higher  considering  the  number  of  people  fleeing  the  area  to  stay  in  other 
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ortation  vehicles,  17  boats  and  4 helicopters during the emergency, which considering the capacity of each 
vehicle and the time horizon of one day, ought to be enough for the evacuation activities. 
 
Before the flood of 2007, the public catalogue of facilities of Villahermosa  contained 107 shelters with a total 
capacity of 26,380 people. The catalogue considered the use of some police stations to provide support for 4-10 
people. Those facilities can be arguably appropriate  to serve as shelter for disaster  victims.  Beyond that, the 
limited capacity of these facilities creates the need to serve several facilities under disaster conditions, which 
represents a challenge for relief distribution. 
 
Contradicting the evidence that shelters usually are underused (Nigg et al. 2006), there was insufficient capacity 
in the shelters listed by authorities to accommodate  the evacuees. There was a need to improvise, even to the 
point of using private homes as shelters.  The result was the use of around 676 shelters in the area. Shelters 
declared  to  have  been  used  by  authorities  during  the  emergency  were  identified  and  georeferenced   in 
TransCAD® using a layer of the road network available from INEGI. 
 
The  results  of  the  analysis  agree  with  reports  of  facilities  flooded  and  the  demand  exceeding  the  capacity 
provided by the authorities (Santos-Reyes et al. 2010). It is believed than more than one million people affected 
by the disaster could not find shelters (Santos-Reyes et al. 2010). 
 
Conversely,  human resources were exceeding the needs of the situation.  From the co-responsibility  branch of 
the disaster  management  hierarchy in Mexico,  there were 13,124 members  of staff from 7 organisations  for 
support  on  shelters,  and  3,150  teams  (including  one  doctor,  a nurse,  a  dentist  and  two  helpers)  from  five 
organisations for healthcare in shelters as well. The military provided guidelines of six members of shelter staff 
to  serve  90  people  for  activities  such  as  cooking,  security,  organising  leisure  activities,  among  others, 
meanwhile  it  was  required  to  have  one  healthcare  team  for  every  90  people  sheltered.  Following  those 
guidelines,  it seemed  authorities  had roughly enough  personnel  to serve around  196,860  people  in terms  of 
shelter care and 283,500 people in terms of healthcare. Considering the estimated demand of 99,000 people, 
authorities had nearly two and three times the employees required for shelter care and healthcare, respectively. 
The number of staff in the area was more than that required to serve the highest number of people estimated by 
National authorities at any point (150,000 people). 
 
Stock prepositioning 
 
DICONSA,   organisation   in  charge   of  procurement   and  social  programmes,   reported  a  stock  of  2,500 
prepositioned food pantries available for distribution in the area. In terms of medicines, there was a local supply 
of medicines  from the health authorities  (National and State). Distribution  of the initial stock was planned to 
take place right after the disaster giving time to undertake needs assessment.  With knowledge  about demand, 
State authorities could request food and medicines from FONDEN and CENAPRECE, respectively. 
 
It is evident that the magnitude of the event exceeded the capacity held by authorities. There were enough items 
to satisfy a little over 10% of the population in terms of food, and enough medicine to cover less than 3% of the 
population in the first days of the emergency. Because of the magnitude of the event, this is understandable. However,  
considering  the  objective  of  stock  prepositioning  about  reduction  of  lead  time,  the  process  to determine 
the number and location of stock to preposition is essential. Currently, there is no information about a clear policy 
to determine the number of stock to preposition other than available budget. For instance, after the flood  of 
Acapulco  in 2013,  authorities  changed  from the 2,500 food  pantries  held before  the emergency  to 
10,000 food pantries for prepositioning (DICONSA 2014), which was around the number of people sheltered in 
the State during the flood. The stock was subsequently reduced to 5,000 three years after the flood. 
 
In the case, the number of food and medicine prepositioned seemed arbitrary. The number of items was similar 
to  the  number  kept  in  other  regions  of  the  country,  without  regard  to  vulnerability  and  the  demographic 
composition. Therefore, the prepositioning policy did not provide the expected result of enhancing performance. 
Moreover,  the  analysis  emphasises  the  need  to  determine  the  number  of  items  to preposition  based  on an 
analysis of previous events, the demographic conditions and prospective scenarios. 
 
Relief distribution 
 
Mexican  authorities  deployed  large  quantities  of  items  to  Tabasco  using  the  FONDEN,  being  the  Centro 
Municipality the main focus of the aid. Water and food were the focus of authorities, although sand bags along 
with blankets and mattresses were also supplied in large numbers. 
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A list of items shipped by authorities obtained from SINAPROC and cross-referenced with information from the 
Ministry of Interior provided information about demand estimates of National and State authorities, along with the 
number of items shipped to the Centro Municipality.  There were discrepancies between National and State 
authorities  regarding  the  estimated  number  of  people  affected  ranging  from  22,500  to  367,500  people. 
Inaccurate  estimations show potential for underestimation,  but a common problem in reality is overestimation 
led by a ‘false’ sense of urgency (Kovacs and Spens 2011). There are some stages in which the estimations of 
State authorities were more than three times the estimation of National authorities, with a sudden decrease days 
later. These discrepancies reveal poor information management. Even if only half of the food sent by authorities 
reached the area, it would be more than twice the food required for people sheltered. Including the relief sent 
from  other  organisations,   the  amount  of  food  provided  was  considerably  more  than  what  was  needed. 
Additionally, lack of information updates was identified, which led to oversupply of some resources (i.e. food) 
and undersupply of others (i.e. diapers and towels). 
 
Despite all the efforts from the participants,  relief distribution  became a significant  issue as demonstrated  by 
reports of shortages of food (Santos-Reyes  et al. 2010), medicines and supplementary  items. According to the 
information,  the problem  was the shortage  of items at the first stage and delays  to deliver  the relief,  which 
confirms the failure of the stock pre-positioning policy.  This partly occurred because of uneven coverage due to 
political interference (Dudley 2007), impeding the provision of relief to high priority communities. 
 
 
5.5.  Effect of the fit between the decision-making  structure  and  operational activities  on the ground  in 
logistics performance 
 
The  impact  of  the  fit  between  the  decision-making  structure  and  operational  activities  on  the  ground  in 
performance is based on three types of measures: resources, output and flexibility (See Beamon 1999). 
 
Resources 
 
Resources  in disaster  management  include vehicles,  relief aid, human resources  and facilities,  among others. 
This  research  shows  a significant  disagreement  between  the  centralised  system  and  operations  in terms  of 
resources. Looking at human resources, the Mexican system works through the activation of different layers, 
depending on the magnitude  of the situation. The purpose is to allow the decision-maker  to authorise enough 
resources to manage the emergency,  thereby using resources efficiently.  However, the activation of one layer 
(i.e. local, regional and/or national) means in fact the activation of many organisations, which at the operational 
level are deployed with the purpose to reach as many people as possible. This was shown in the case, where the 
healthcare and shelter care needed could have been achieved with fewer organisations. Therefore, the policy to 
minimise  the use of resources  at the top of the structure  is clearly contradicted  at the bottom  of the system, 
allowed by the limited visibility of the decision-maker.  The overcrowding  of people can be evident for field 
agents, but it is hardly noticed on the top layers of the hierarchy. The result is convergence  of people, which 
hinders operations  by complicating coordination and allowing overlapping activities (Oloruntoba 2005). 
 
Regarding  stock  prepositioning,  the  amount  of  prepositioned  stock  is  set  depending  on  budget,  instead  of 
determining  the  number  of  items  based  on  other  criteria  such  as  vulnerability,  previous  disasters  and  the 
demographic  composition  of the country. Nevertheless,  for the case study this was reflected in a very limited 
capacity of immediate supply compared to demand, which delayed response and complicated the scenario at the 
initial stages of the disaster. Hence, this policy was unable to provide insurance of immediate response, which 
further complicates the successful use of centralised decision-making because of the possibility of slow response 
(Takeda and Helms 2006). 
 
Facility location is left for co-responsibility branches. However, the central decision-maker needs to oversee this 
activity  better.  Shelter  location  is performed  independently  from  distribution  centre  location.  The  former  is 
carried out by civil protection authorities using public facilities, whereas the latter is undertaken by DICONSA 
based  on pre-owned  regional  facilities.  Therefore,  decisions  are fragmented,  which  is a contradiction  to the 
centralised system. Focusing on shelters, there are three major issues identified. The first is the absence of risk 
maps, the second is the use of unsuitable facilities because of the lack of well-defined criteria, and the third is 
the absence of scenario planning to manage demand. These problems are a result of the disagreement between 
the decision-making structure and the operational activities on the ground, which had an impact on poor facility 
location and management. 
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Output 
 
In  disaster  management,  the  perspective  of  the  beneficiaries  is essential.  A significant  aspect  affecting  the 
perception of the disaster victims is relief distribution. Distribution becomes a problem in a centralised system 
because distribution plans ought to be drafted after assessing the state of the infrastructure (Holguin-Veras et al. 
2012). In view of the multi-layered structure behind a centralised system, drafting the plans and approving them 
can be very time consuming and therefore unsuitable for disaster operations. There are two strategies embedded 
in the Mexican system to alleviate this problem; the development  of maps of the disaster to draft distribution 
plans in advanced,  and stock prepositioned  for immediate  deployment  to allow for planning  time. However, 
plans based on untested  assumptions  about the operational  environment  can affect the success  of operations 
(Nathan et al. 2017). That strategy assumes that operational authorities have risk maps and enough prepositioned 
stock, the latter being arbitrarily determined as discussed previously. 
 
Regarding risk maps, nowadays the National atlas (the repository of risk maps) is still seriously incomplete and 
local  atlases  are  even  in poorer  conditions  (Alexander  2015).  The  reasons  for  this  are  the  lack  of  archive 
material, financial resources and human personnel (CONAGUA  2011). Consequently,  disaster planning is not 
based on the analysis of hazard scenarios nor geographical  factors (Alexander  2015), incurring a high risk of 
choosing unsuitable facilities. Therefore, distribution plans at the operational level are indeed drafted after the 
disaster. The case of Villahermosa provided an example of this problem. The lack of a well-prepared risk atlas 
prevented authorities from developing distribution plans, which complicated the selection of suitable routes and 
effective  shelter location. The result was the need of improvisation  at the operational  level and delays in the 
provision of relief items. 
 
Flexibility 
 
The capacity to react to variations in demand and adapt to different conditions is closely related to information 
management.  Several issues for information  management  have been identified  in centralised  systems  such as 
one-way communication (Scolobig et al. 2015), complicated the access to the system (Boin and Lagadec 2000) 
and the inability to consider external information (Takeda and Helms 2006). In the case presented, information 
sharing  was  a  challenge  that  led  to  poor  needs  assessment  and  made  centralised  decision-making  highly 
inefficient. The centralised approach relies on accurate information filtered through the layers of the hierarchy, 
but reality showed contradictions in demand estimates between National and State authorities. Independent data 
gathering and analysis can be useful to get robust results, but poor information sharing makes the effort fruitless. 
 
A  centralised  system  should  use  few  comprehensive  information  systems  (Marks  1978).  Conversely,  each 
agency handled its own information  without sharing it, which can derive in unreliable data and duplication  of 
efforts. It can be argued then that information management during disasters in Mexico is mostly decentralised, 
because different data was collected from various agencies and handled independently. This contradiction led to a 
centralised system with conflicting and incomplete information for decision-making, and operational activities on 
the ground with decisions based on inaccurate conditions. The result was an inflexible disaster management 
system with fragmented information. 
 
Also related to flexibility, the case showed infrequent needs assessment update. Because of the work involved in 
collecting and analysing information for each agency, the time between one assessment and the next could be extended 
to weeks or even a month. In view of the dynamic conditions of disaster management,  that situation prevented 
the disaster management system to adapt and react to variations effectively. 
 
Overall,  this  research  has  identified  misalignment  between  the  decision-making  structure  and  operational 
activities  on  the  ground  in  terms  of  information  collection  and  sharing,  facility  location  procedures,  the 
prepositioning policy and distribution planning. The result has been the conflicting use of resources, deficient 
satisfaction of disaster victims and an inflexible disaster management system affecting logistics performance. 
 
 
 
6.    DISCUSSION 
 
The analysis shows poor logistics performance  as a result of significant  disagreements  between centralisation 
and operations. The first area to consider is to strengthen preparedness  and response to support centralisation. 
The  slow  response  associated  with  this  approach  (Takeda  and  Helms  2006)  can  be  alleviated  by  placing 
resources  and  attention  in  disaster  preparedness.  The  operational  activities  on  the  ground  are  often  more 
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concerned with disaster response, but appropriate planning can reduce ambiguity (Wijngaard et al. 2006) and response 
times. Planning, however, has to include input from different stakeholders at different levels to make the plans 
useful, achievable and sustainable. This integration relates directly to distribution, facility location and stock 
prepositioning. 
 
The alignment of goals is another important aspect to bear in mind. In a centralised system, it is expected that 
the  goals  from  top  layers  guide  the  entire  system,  but  in  a  collaborative   environment  such  as  disaster 
management  the  goals  of different  stakeholders,  governmental  and non-governmental,  can  affect  the  result. 
Logistics performance in the case of Villahermosa was affected by conflicting goals at different levels, even when the 
overarching goal was to prevent death and suffering. Instead of having the operational activities on the ground working within 
the boundaries established by the top layers of hierarchy, the objectives and guidelines need to be properly agreed across 
participants to have consistent operations. 
 
Information management is an essential area to achieve high logistics performance. The case showed the impact 
of having  a centralised  structure  without  collaborative  and reliable  information  systems.  The duplication  of 
efforts  and  the  unreliability  of  information  severely  affects  decision-making   and  complicates  operational 
activities on the ground. Therefore, a collaborative and interactive system needs to be developed to support the 
decision-making structure at the top and to allow communication and the development of robust information to 
support operational activities on the ground. Mechanisms to aggregate and cross-reference information can help 
reduce the number of overlaps between different participants and provide a better quality of information to top 
layers of the disaster management system. 
 
According  to the interview  with the representative  from OCHA,  the clarity about the decision-maker  in the 
current system allows them to quickly approach them to offer support. This is an important revelation because 
even though Mexican authorities are commonly reluctant to ask for external support, when needed, international 
organisations  can promptly  provide  support  for the government,  recognising  the legitimacy  of the authority. 
This  aligns  with  the  view  that  having  a  clear  strategic  centre  and  collective  vision  can  be  beneficial  for 
operations  (Chandes  and Paché  2010).  This  view  is contradicted,  however,  by smaller  organisations  which 
struggled to get in touch with the government and relevant decision-makers (Hernández 2009). This is expected 
because in this kind of system there is the possibility of an input overload (Hart et al. 1993). Adding more actors 
to the system can complicate control even further, which led authorities to ignore less recognised organisations. 
This is a problem because self-initiated participants are a reality in emergencies, and movements such as occupy 
Sandy have shown the potential  of people-centred  initiatives.  Therefore,  following  the findings  of Khan and 
Rahman (2007), a participation and collaboration mechanism that joins community members and different 
stakeholders  can  be  valuable  to  improve  disaster  management  in  the  country  considering  the  centralised 
decision-making structure. Although working partnerships can emerge from disaster response activities, there is a 
need to develop agreements and policies in advance for the joint participation between different organisations and 
the Mexican government. Such agreements can ease coordination, clarify functions and improve overall operations 
by empowering different organisations and the wider society to work with the government instead of passively 
following them. 
 
Needs assessment is one of the most important activities in the first hours after disaster (Charles et al. 2016), but 
the  case  showed  poor  management  of  this  activity.  Inaccurate  needs  assessment  caused  problems  such  as 
shortages of relief and uneven distribution.  The flow of low-priority products can hinder operations (Holguin- 
Veras et al. 2012), because of the space and resources required.  Needs assessment and procurement policies for 
disaster management should follow reliable and well-planned guidelines for a centralised system to work. These 
policies should ensure the flow of resources could satisfy different requirements in a timely manner and account 
for the operational capabilities. Currently that is an area for improvement for the case for Mexico. 
 
Standardisation  is one of the key aspects to align centralisation  and operational  activities on the ground. The 
case revealed that standardisation of relief items was a significant success for distribution after the initial phase, 
because it allowed to use more optimally the transportation resources and to make the distribution process more 
efficient. This idea has to be extrapolated to procedures and guidelines to improve logistics performance.  The 
needs assessment  process showed that procedures are not standardised,  allowing each organisation  to operate 
under their own terms. This approach  created discrepancies  among organisations  which affected the level of 
service. For centralised decisions to achieve the expected results, the system has to create the right conditions 
through proper guidance and support to the operational activities on the ground, which has to be informed by the 
perspective of different stakeholders. 
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The presence  of a set of regulations  and an organisation  overseeing  the resources  can support  the stream  of 
literature developing optimisation models (Caunhye et al. 2012), because models commonly aggregate resources 
to provide an optimal response, which is in principle better than the sum of optimised responses from each actor. 
Nevertheless,  models have to be robust enough to account of the uncertain conditions of disaster management 
and the set of unforeseen challenges encountered, combining reliability and responsiveness. 
 
Beyond the measures discussed, there are more alternatives in the literature that can be useful. Investment on 
disaster management capabilities, as mentioned by Kunz et al. (2014), to improve the flow of resources within 
the  country  and  from  outside,  and  agility  and  leanness  in humanitarian  operations  could  be  approaches  to 
improve responsiveness  that can be supported  by a centralised  system (Cozzolino  2012). On the other hand, 
flattening the decision-making structure in disaster management would also allow for a speedy response. 
 
Overall,  this  analysis  emphasises  the  importance  of  looking  at  the  alignment  between  the  decision-making 
structure and operational activities on the ground. Instead of approaching the disaster management system from 
the  perspective  of  the  decision-making  structure  or  the  operational  activities  on  the  ground,  the  alignment 
between them has to be considered to enhance performance. This analysis suggests that appropriate alignment 
between both dimensions can alleviate some of the shortcomings centralisation and improve the performance of 
the disaster management system. According to this analysis, several of the issues commonly associated to 
centralisation  are  due  to the  misalignment  between  the decision-making  structure  and  operations.  This  is a 
relevant finding because it moves from the current argument about the appropriate decision-making structure for 
disaster  management  to  the  identification  of  components  to  implement  an  efficient  and  effective  disaster 
management  system. It shows that the key for high performance  is embedded  in the integrated  design of the 
system and the alignment between its components, which can prove a more feasible approach that moving from 
one decision-making  structure to another, especially considering the evidence of problems associated with both 
approaches. 
 
 
 
7.    POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The analysis presented  provided  a set of implications  that are relevant for practice.  The implementation  of a 
decision-making structure has to be supported by sensible assumptions at the operational level. This can prevent 
significant variations between policy and logistics activities. 
 
The  use  of  a  centralised  decision-making  structure  in  Mexico  faces  challenges  related  to  responsiveness, 
information management and poor collaboration.  The current response processes are designed to use resources 
efficiently,  but these  require  gathering,  compiling  and  presenting  information  to decision-makers  on higher 
layers of the system, thereby increasing response time. That information is not always shared across participants 
to find a collaborative  solution, complicating  joint operations. Additionally,  distribution is performed by local 
branches of the government,  which can use disaster relief with political purposes. It is important to create an 
inclusive  disaster  management  system  to  facilitate  operations,  prevent  delays,  allow  the  participation   of 
unbiased actors, and adapt to the dynamic environment  posed by disasters. This requires a revision of disaster 
management policies and the structure of the disaster management system. 
 
The  activation  of  agencies  based  on  layers  of  government  has  to  be  thoroughly  revised.  Sending  every 
organisation available to the field is not the solution unless the right resources are at their disposal. In view of 
the  logistics  activities  performed  during  disasters,  the  activation  could  be  linked  to  the  deployment  of 
organisations   based  on  the  area  of  expertise  and  the  needs  assessment  to  prevent  congestion  and  idle 
participants. Therefore, policy has to be developed to ensure resources are being properly managed and that guidelines 
are in place to improve operations. 
 
Quality assurance processes for facility location, stock prepositioning and needs assessment have to be properly 
designed and implemented. This research identified several challenges related to the lack of control and proper 
management   of  those  activities.  Moreover,   these  quality  assurance   processes  have  to  be  shared  across 
participant  organisations  to identify shortcomings  (such as the lack of risk atlases  or the absence  of facility 
selection guidelines) and achieve high performance operations. In that sense, policy about disaster management 
has to provide guidance for clear boundaries and responsibilities  of different participants,  with the inclusion of 
potential self-initiated actors. 
 
8.    CONCLUSIONS 
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This paper provided  an analysis  of the impact  of the alignment  between  centralisation  and operations  in the 
activities  performed  in  the  flood  of  Villahermosa   in  2007.  Data  gathered  from  governmental   and  non- 
governmental organisations was used to look into the logistics operations carried out during the emergency and 
assess the performance of the disaster management system. 
 
The centralised decision-making structure implemented in Mexico faces challenges of communication and 
responsiveness, as shown by several challenges arising from the case. The information showed discrepancies in 
the estimation of victims between State and National authorities, infrequent information updates, and delays on 
the initial stages of distribution. However, it was found that these problems are not only inherent of the decision- 
making structure, but also a result of the misalignment  between centralisation  and the operational activities on 
the ground. This article argues that aligning both dimensions  can reduce some of the challenges and enhance 
logistics   performance   in  a  disaster   management   system.   Considering   the  nature   of  centralisation,   the 
implementation  of investments in disaster capabilities, agility and leanness can help align the decision-making 
structure and the operational activities on the ground to improve the logistics performance of the system. 
 
Because coordination  and collaboration  are of paramount importance in disaster management  (B. Balcik et al. 
2010), these should be strengthened by information sharing and clear agreements about guidelines for operation, 
to avoid  duplication  of efforts  and uneven  coverage.  In the case of Villahermosa, the information gathered showed 
that poor collaboration led to the supply of more than twice the food required. Additionally, uneven coverage took place 
because of political reasons and the improvised facilities used by authorities. It is important to adapt the centralised 
structure to allow dialogue across levels and organisations to provide a more responsive system under uncertain 
conditions at the operational level. This requires to consider several layers of managers in a centralised system 
(Christensen and Knudsen 2010) and the potential of introducing better information systems and well-designed 
operational procedures on the ground to ease collaboration. 
 
Generalisation is one of the challenges of the use of case studies. However, several of insights obtained from the 
case can be extrapolated  to other  centralised  decision-making  systems.  The  analysis  was based  on logistics 
activities  commonly  performed  by host governments  in disasters  as stated  by Caunhye  et al. (2012),  which 
makes this approach suitable to other similar systems. For instance, the argument about policy and plans based 
on  untested  assumptions  shows  a  gap  in  the  disaster  management  structure  that  can  be  found  on  several 
developing countries. Therefore, the analysis of the fit between the decision-making structure and operational 
activities on the ground can deliver interesting results in similar settings. However, there are limitations in terms 
of the type of disaster management  structure, the level of development  of the country, the financing structure 
and the governmental stability that can restrict the generalisation of some practical implications identified. 
 
The  analysis  of  procedures  and  policy  is  based  on  documentation   and  interviews  whereas  the  logistics 
performance  was  assessed  using  secondary  information.  Therefore,  information  from  the interviews  can  be 
affected by bias or experience,  and inaccurate  records of the activities during the emergency could affect the 
data. We tried to avoid those problems by cross-referencing  the information and checking accounts from other 
sources  such  as  newspapers  and  academic  articles,  but  we  reckon  information  can  be  a  limitation  of  this 
research. Furthermore, information about transportation during evacuation and casualty transportation was not 
available from authorities, complicating the analysis. Finally, the analysis performed is focused on logistics 
performance based on the activities identified by Caunhye et al. (2012), without considering their link to other 
emergency activities. 
 
This  analysis  showed  the  importance  of looking  at the alignment  of  the  decision-making  structure  and the 
operational activities on the ground to achieve successful operations during disasters. This area can be further 
benefited by future research using primary information for the assessment of logistics performance, cross-case 
analysis to identify variations among countries, papers looking at the development of an assessment of logistics 
performance on a decentralised disaster management system to draw comparisons, and articles discussing the 
interaction  of information  management,  collaboration  agreements  and decision-making  structures  to achieve 
high performance humanitarian operations. 
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1 
2 
3 Table 1. Data collected about the case of Villahermosa 
4 Type of data Source FOI 
5 Shelters used PC, ISSET 700106513, 06401914 
6 Facility cleaning cost DIF 1236000003414 
7 Distribution centres used SEDENA, DICONSA  700003414, 2015000000714 
8 Procurement per product DICONSA  R2015000008113 
9 Required personnel per 
10 activity 
SEDENA, PC, IMSS, DICONSA  700003214, 00001514, 00430914, 00432114, 
64101320214, 700004914, 2015000010414 
11 Number of personnel per 
12 activity per organisation 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 Total personnel per 
18 agency 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
DICONSA, DIF, IMSS, ISSET, PC, 
SMEXICO, STABASCO, SCT, SEDENA, 
SEGOB, SEMAR, SSP 
 
 
 
 
DICONSA, DIF, IMSS, ISSET, PC, 
SMEXICO, STABASCO, SCT, SEDENA, 
SEGOB, SEMAR, SSP 
2015000001314, 2015000003814, 
2015000004014, 06399914, 0064100438914, 
06644914, 06402614, 06402714, 
0001200006714, 06400314, 06243714, 
0000700031014, 0000700144314, 
0000700106513, 0000400264914, Press release 
148/2007, 05924314 
2015000001314, 2015000003814, 
2015000004014, 06399914, 0064100438914, 
06644914, 06402614, 06402714, 
0001200006714, 06400314, 06243714, 
0000700031014, 0000700144314, 
0000700106513, 0000400264914, Press release 
148/2007, 05924314 
Vehicles used CENTRO, DICONSA, DIF, IMSS, PC, 
24 
SMEXICO, STABASCO, SEDENA, 
25 SEGOB, SEMAR, SSP 
26 SEDENA 
27 
28 
29 
30 
05923014, 05923214, 2015000001014, 
2015000003714, 2015000003914, 06400114, 
0064100439014, 0064100439414, 06402814, 
0001200006814, 05923814, 05924014, 
0000700002614, 0000700031114, 
0000700031314, 0000700106513, 
0000400264914, Press release 148/2007, 
05924414 
31 Medicines delivered  SEGOB  0000400160314 
32 Flood mask CENAPRED  0413000000214 
33 Technical reports of the 
situation 
SEMAR, CENAPRED  0064100439014, 0413000000514 
34 
International aid SRE 0000500088214 
35 
Elevation models of the 
36 region 
United States Geological Survey (www.usgs.gov) and the website of the National Institute of 
Geography and Statistics (INEGI) in Mexico (http://www.inegi.org.mx/) 
37 Road network  Software developed by INEGI, namely SCINCE 2010 (http://www.inegi.org.mx/) 
38 Neighbourhoods 
39 denominated Basic Geo- 
40 Statistical Area 
41 (AGEBs) 
Software developed by INEGI, namely SCINCE 2010 (http://www.inegi.org.mx/) 
42 Demographical data Software developed by INEGI, namely SCINCE 2010 (http://www.inegi.org.mx/) 
43 Resources from NGOs  Online reports from the Mexican Red Cross, Presbyterian Mission Agency, Action by 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
 
44 Churches Together International, Aktion Deutschland Hilft, Samaritan’s purse, Malteser, 
45 
World Vision, Search and Rescue Assistance in Disasters, Medical Teams International, 
Adventist Development and Relief Agency, Americares and the World Food Programme. 
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48 
49 
